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THE question of the power of a state to regulate rates of fare
and freight on the railroads within her limits has passed from the
region of doubtful into that of settled law. The state cannot
barter away the police powers which she holds for the general
security and welfare of her citizens, merely by giving to a corporation chartered power to-establish rates of toll for itself; and the
exercise by the legislature of its paramount right to prescribe
rates, does not violate any contract with the corporation. Such, at
least, is the doctrine of the famous Granger Cases, 4 Otto; such
the conclusion of Judge REDFIELD, an authority on railroad law
(27 Vermont 140), and of other authority unnecessary here to cite.
It follows then that a review of the American law on the subject
of state regulation of railroads, either through the medium of railroad commissions or by direct enactments, entails the examination
and comparison o'fstatutes rather than the collation of authorities.
Such a review it is proposed to make, very briefly, in this article.
The "railroad question " is not strictly a legal one, and, except
incidentally, any discussion of it will not be attempted.
The chief grievances, or problems rather, which go to make up
the railroad question and which legislation has been invoked to
remedy may be ranged under two heads-extortion and discrimination. Extortion includes the charging of rates higher than reasonable or higher than necessary to afford the railroad company a fair
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return on its capital, and the combination by two or more companies to raise rates, or the pooling of earnings and dividing them
according to an agreed proportion, by several competing lines, that
high rates may be maintained. Discrimination may be against
localities-usually by charging higher rates from and to non-competing than competing points, or by charging more for short dis-'
tance local than for long distance through freights, or against
persons by affording one shipper or one connecting line lower rates
or better facilities than another. This, of course, is the extreme
anti-railroad view.
Special methods on the part of government for dealing with
such practices fall more or less exactly under one or another of
three systems.
1. The system of the Western states-stringent and minute
regulation of tolls by means of statutory enactments. There may
or may not be a railroad commission.
2. The English system of a commission with almost judicial
powers, to hear and decide each complaint on its own merits.
3. The Massachusetts system of a commission, whose function •
it is to investigate and report to some department of the government.
Some remarks on the general nature and powers of railroad
commissions, which play so prominent a part in most systems of
railroad law, are appropriate.
A railroad commission is usually appointed by the governor,
alone or with the approval of the legislature. In some states the
seeds of evil have been sown in making the office an elective one.
Some railroad commiisions consist of one member only; the usual
number is three. The term of office is commonly three years, but
varies from one to six years. No person in railroad employment
or holding railroad stock is eligible. The commissioners exercise
a supervision of all railroads and other transportation companies
within the state, investigate accidents, notify the companies of such
changes in rolling stock, buildings, road and methods of management as they deem proper for the safety and comfort of the public,
and inquire into their financial condition. The companies must
mhake annual reports of their business, assets, etc.
The commissioners have authority to require of any railroad
official information touching his road, to inspect any railroad property, to examine stock lists and other books and papers, and to
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employ experts to aid in their investigations. They may summon
witnesses and administer oaths. They are entitled to free passes
when travelling on official business. Their salaries and expenses
are usually defrayed by the companies, either in proportion to the
latter's gross receipts or their length of road, or the relative time
which the commission has been obliged to devote to them. Most acts
contain a proviso that no request or advice of the board shall impair
or affect the legal obligations and liabilities of the corporations.
The board must make a yearly or biennial report to some specified department of the state government, usually the executive,
giving the results of their labors and embodying any recommendations they desire to make, and special reports when necessary.
They have power, in many states, on application of a one-fiftieth
interest, or of a director, to make a thorough examination of the
financial condition of a railroad and to publish the results in the
newspapers.
The remedies at the command of the board, varying in different
states and according to the emergency, are a report to the governor,
legislature, or judicial officers of the state, a suit by the attorneygeneral ora county attorney atthe commissioners' instance, or a direct
application by the commissioners to the courts for an injunction.!
The first railroad commission law was that of Connecticut, of
1849, under which three commissioners for each railroad in the
state were to be appointed, whose duty it was "carefully to examine
the whole of the road and to see that the corporation faithfully
complies with the laws of this state and with the provisions of its
charter." Now all the New England states have railroad commis,
sions upon a nearly uniform plan. That of Massachusetts, created
in 1869, is the best known, partly from the high reputation of
some of its members. The act resembles the Vermont act of 1855.
The Massachusetts commission has prescribed a uniform method
of keeping accounts for all the corporations under its supervision.
If we are not mistaken, the same method is followed by the railroads of New England and of New York.

I In McCoy v. C. ., St. L. 4 C. RailroadCo., 22 Am. Law Reg., U. S. 725) the
United States Circuit Court in Ohio, considered the question of the Jurisdiction of
Courts of Equity to compel railroads to discharge the duties imposed upon them by
law. As will be seen in the course of the present article, this jurisdiction is also
conferred, to a greater or less extent, by statute in many states. It is likely that
mandatory injunctions will yet play an important part in railroad regulation.
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As regards direct legislative regulation of rates--in Massachusetts, railroads are expressly allowed to make and alter their own
rates, subject to a power of revisal in the general court. There iJ5
a law, however, giving the railroad commissioners power to cause
to be established a fair proportion between the rates for carriage of
milk in large and small quantities. A Connecticut law prohibits
discrimination by a railroad between -other connecting roads, and
another of the same kind has reference to the milk traffic. New
Hampshire goes farthest, requiring schedules of tolls to be' pub-"
lished by the railroads, changeable only after thirty days' notice,
and forbidding, by statute, in 1879, higher rates by the car load
for short distances than for long. In general, however, what Mr.
C. F. Adams, himself a member of the first Massachusetts commission, says of his own state, in a little work on the Railroad
Problem, is true of the rest of New England. "In the Massachusetts act the fundamental idea was publicity, the commission represented public opinion. * * * The only appeal provided was to'

publicity. The board of commissioners was set up as a sort of lens
by means of which the otherwise scattered rays of public opinion
could be concentrated to a focus and brought to bear upon a given
point. The commissioners had to listen and they might investigate
and report, they could do little more."
The Virginia act of 1876 is somewhat different from those of
New- England. The railroad commissioner seems to be to some extent the agent of the Board of Public Worls. If a railroad, after
written notice from the commissioner, continues to violate the laws
or its charter, or does, not heed his monition in such matters as
repairs or changes in the conduct of the road, he reports to the
Board of Public Works, which may authorize him to apply for an
injunction. This Virginia law seems to afford a more direct and
speedy remedy for abuses than those we have considered.
By the' same act, discriminations based on difference of distance, and preferences and advantages to one shipper over
another are forbidden, and the effort is made to prevent higher
charges for freights coming into the state than for like freights
passing through the state, and these provisions may be enjoined
by injunction.
. In contrast with the New England system of railroad law is that
of the West, taking its key-note from the well-known Granger
movement several years ago. In the matter of railroad abuses, no
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region has felt the shoe pinch more than has the portion of the West
traversed by' the great trunk line systems. A few cents flu'ctuation
in grain rates made all the difference to the farmers between a good
and a losing year. Several states, about 1871, passed laws almost
amusing in their severity. Illinois set up a tariff of charges, any
departure from which incurred a penalty of $1000 ; and where the
violation was wilful, proceedings were to be taken for the forfeiture
of the company's franchises. In Iowa, the governor, on the recommendation of twenty taxpayers of the county where the suit was
brought, might devote state funds in aid of proceedings against railroadg for illegal rates; and the offending corporation was confronted
with quintuple damages, costs and an attorney fee in every court to
which the case was taken.
In Minnesota, a rigid per ton per mile system of charges was
sought to be enforced by a penalty of $1000, or forfeiture of corporate franchises, at the discretion of the court. In Wisconsin, the
law of 1874 divided railroads into several classes, and prescribed
the maximum rates chargeable by each class under penalty of treble
damages, fine and loss of compensation, jurisdiction of the act
being extended to justices of the peace. Although these statutes
have been repealed-that of Illinois was declared unconstitutional
in C. & A. Railroad 6b. v. The People, 67 Ill. 11-the laws which
replace them are still severe. These four states now have railroad
commissions. The Illinois commission, which existed under the
Granger Act of 1871, has extensive powers. Its principal duty
seems to be that of ferreting out violations of the laws against railroad extortion and discrimination. The statute definition of these
offences is so exhaustive as to provide against almost every possible
evasion. The punishment for violation is a penalty of from $1000
to $2500, besides treble damages, costs and attorney fees. Actions
in these cases take precedence of all but criminal business. The
commissioners make and publish a schedule of rates which -they
may revise and alter at discretion. A departure from these rates
on the part of a corporation is prima facie evidence of extortion.
The attorney-general and the county'attorneys are to bring suit at
the commissioners' instance, besides the private remedy of the injured party. The existing laws of Minnesota and Wisconsin are
also strict, those of Iowa less so, perhaps, but their railroad commissions have little direct povier, being nearer the Massachusetts
plan. The Missouri commission classifies freights and regulates
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tariffs. No state goes further than Ohio in the matter of voluminous and minute railroad legislation. Of the western states east
of the Missouri river, Indiana, Kentucky and Tennessee alone appear to be without special railroad legislation governing rates of
toll. In the others, including at least one of the Pacific states,
California, the amount of itemized-if we may use the term-railroad law is remarkable. Page after page of most statute books are
taken up with classifications and tariffs of freight or with forms for
the annual returns, showing extent of business, description of rolling stock, salaries of officers, in short, a complete exhibit of their
condition, which the companies have to render. This requiring of
railroad returns according to a prescribed schedule obtains in other
than the Western states, however-New York has had such a law
since 1850.
Mr. Joseph Nimmo, Jr., of the U" S. Bureau of Statistics, in his
report for 1879, on the Internal Commerce of the United States,
thus speaks of the results of the Granger legislation: "Experience has proved that certain of the restrictive measures adopted a
few years ago by the legislatures of some of the Western states were
in their practical workings detrimental to the producing and commercial interests of the country, and at the same time injurious to
the railroad interests. Nevertheless, the legislative acts regulating
freight charges which have been adopted in this country have'generally had a salutary influence as reformatory measures. The benefits of such acts have resulted rather from their moral influence in
restraining and preventing abuses than from their direct effect in
enforcing the right and correcting the wrong. The railroad companies have been constrained to explain the principles upon which
their freight tariffs are based, and thus the public have been enabled
to 'gain much valuable information as to the distinction which exists
between just and unjust discriminations, and between practices which
are based upon economic considerations and sound commercial principles and such as are indefensible and therefore constitute abuses
of the rights and privileges conferred upon the companies."
Some quite recent legislation next demands consideration. And
first, Kansas has this year (1883) replaced by a new law her system
of maximum per ton per mile rates. No higher rate is to be demanded of one person than another for a like service, nor a higher
rate from any given point than amounts to a fair proportion of the
charge from another given point. This section is almost the coun-
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terpart of one in the Iowa statute book. The provisions as to penalties and damages resemble those in other Western states. Pooling
contracts are forbidden under a penalty of $5000 for each month
the law is violated. There is a board of railroad commissioners
who are, upon complaint to them, to certify what is a reasonable
charge in the particular case and for the company then to exceed
that rate is primafacie evidence of extortion. This statute, though
in some respects relaxed from the Granger severity, shows little
advance upon the present laws of other Western states, enacted some
years before it. To forbid pooling, for instance, is to deny the truth
now well understood, that these associations are formed not to
enrich the parties to them but to prevent their ruin through competition.
The adjoining state of Nebraska has an act of 1881 regulating
tariffs according to the schedules in force in the year 1880. There
is no commission. The efforts of the state seem directed mainly
towards keeping under scrutiny the lines traversing her territory.
Each railroad passing through the state must have an office therein,
where must be kept open to public inspection the stock list, table
of assets, names of officers of the company and other like items,
under pain of forfeiture of the right to do business in the state, the
road being put into the hands of a receiver.
Besides Virginia, already noticed, and West Virginia, which has
laws dating from 1874, of the thorough-going Granger type, but no
commission, only three Southern states have laws relating to the
present subject of inquiry.
In South Carolina, under an act in 1882, there is one railroad
commissioner. His only direct control of rates is in the case of
pooling contracts, which must be submitted for his approval. - To
receive as well as to allow a rebate on freights is prohibited among
other forms of illegal discrimination. (This illustrates the impracticableness of some railroad laws and the difficulty of the subject.
Rebates and special rates are often most iniquitous; but how can
A. be prevented from accepting better rates than B. if the railroad
chooses to give him the opportunity ? An English decision cited
farther on lays down a better rule.) No higher rate may be charged
for short than for long distances, except that the law is not to be
so construed as to require a "1corporation or combination of corporations to regulate their charges for short distances by their proportion of through rates between terminal or junctional competitive
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points." Railroads must post their tariff schedules in their stations and give notice of intended changes. The commissioner has
autbority in case of violation of law by a railroad, especially in
matters relating to connections with other roads, time schedules,
and rates of toll, after giving the company written notice, to
apply to court for an injunction restraining it from continuing to
violate the law or its charter. Actions for the penalties given by
the statute may be brought by the attorney-general at the commissioner's request; and if a railroad repeatedly and wilfully violates
the law, or judgment is had against it or penalties are recovered
against it under the act more than once, the commissioner may, if
he think it consistent with the public interest, instruct the attorney-general to proceed for the forfeiture of its franchises. This
forfeiture clause differs from that in the Illinois law of 1871. That
statute was declared unconstitutional .(67 I. 11), on the ground
that it denounced so extreme a penalty as forfeiture against discrimination', not against discrimination proved to be unjust, and
because this ultimate penalty was directed against a first offence.
This decision was perhaps kept in view in framing the South Carolina act.1 A clause in the West Virginia act which has been
alluded to, makes forfeiture the penalty for a wilful violation of its
provisions, every violation to be held wilful until the contrary is
proved.
The Georgia act of 1879 differs from all others -in reposing
larger powers in her commissioners. Not dwelling upon the ordinary superintendence which forms so large a part of a commissioners'
duties, it first prohibits extortion and unjust discrimination in general terms, and then makes it the duty of the commissioners to fix
tariffs of freight, rules against rebates and so on, allowing, however, reduced through rates on freights going beyond the state or
coming into it from without. The determination of what are reason
able rates rests in all cases with the commissioners. The commissioners are from time to time to revise and amend the schedules
1 A bill has recently passed both branches of the South Carolina Legislature,
requiring railroads to submit rates to the commissioner for approval or modification.
From the commissioner an appeal lies to the courts, to whom the evidence taken
before the commissioner is submitted, and who must decide the case within ten days,
this decision to be final. This is a new instance of'the tendency, remarked upon
further on, of the newest legislation, to bring matters of railroad regulation under
control of the courts.
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which they have fixed, and these schedules are to be published
for a certain.period in the newspapers, and are to be taken as
conclusive evidence of a reasonable and proper charge. All contracts between railroads must have the commissioners' approval.
Violations of the act are punishable by a penalty of $1000 to
$5000 upon suit by the commissioners through the attorney-general.
The history of this act furnishes the only instance, so far as
known, in which the constitutionality of a Railroad Commission
has been tested. Tilley v. The Savannah, Florida and Western
Railroad,5 Fed. Rep. 641, was an application for an injunction
to restrain the Georgia Railroad Commission from the performance of its functions in fixing and enforcing certain tariffs of rates.
The suit was in the United States Circuit Court. The complainant,
a stockholder of the railroad company, urged, inter alia, that the
rates fixed by the commissioners under the Act of 1879 were too low
to enable the company to earn its interest and dividend ; that the
regulation of tariffs sanctioned by the act amounted really to a taking of property for public use without compensation; that to allow
the commissioners' tariffs to be sufficient evidence of a reasonable
rate was to take away the right of trial by jury; that if the legislature had this power to regulate toll, it could not delegate it to a
commission. But WooDs, Cir. J., held, that an act to regulate
rates qould in no sense be considered a taking or damaging of private property without compensation ; that in making the rates fixed
by the commissioners conclusive evidence of what a reasonable rate
was, the legislature was but prescribing the effect of evidence, a prerogative exercised by all legislative bodies; that under the familiar
principle that the grant of the right to do a certain thing carried
with it the means to accomplish the end, it was competent for the
legislature to delegate its authority to fix reasonable rates to a
commission, the true distinction being between the delegation of
power to make law and the conferring authority or discretion as to
its execution. The bill was accordingly dismissed.
The Alabama statute of 1881 opens by proclaiming the main
track of a railway a public highway-an assertion often supposed
to strike terror into tyrannical corporations, and to have in itself
some magic power for.settling at once and forever the intricacies
of the railroad problem. - The act shows care and consideration,
however. It declares that any undue rate or any unjust discrimiVOL. XXXII.-12
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nation between persons or localities on the part of a railroad is
extortion. Whether a given case amounts to extortion is in all
cases for a jury to decide. No charge can be held extortionate if
it appear that on the basis of such charges the company cannot
more than make a fair return on its capital.
A remark may be permitted at this point. Provisions resembling
the foregoing may be found in other codes, usually, as limiting the
maximum a railroad shall be allowed to earn to a net ten per cent.
on its capital; and such regulations have been claimed as sure
guages by which to fix equitable standards of rates. Such tests
are not invariably accurate, however. In the report before quoted,
Mr. Nimmo says, "the governmental measures for the regulation
of freight rates have had little reference if any to the cost of constructing or of operating railroads," to which may be added-or to
the excess of expenses over profits during periods of loss and
depression. The averagd of railroad dividends is said to fall far
below ten per cent., with *allthe liberty as to charges which the
companies may enjoy. There is no objection to the Alabama law
in theory-its application must involve labor and difficulty.
But to return to the act-if a railroad undertakes to grant drawbacks they must be equal. Special rates may be given in aid of
the development of any industrial enterprise; but these special
rates must be published as are others. This obviously just concession marks the progress in railroad legislation, The commissioners
must consider all tariffs and give notice to the companies of such
changes as seem advisable. If a railroad demands more than the
rate thus fixed and suit is brought, the company is liable to a
penalty and double damages, costs and attorney fees. On the other
hand, although the commissioners' approval of a rate does not bar
an action upon it for extortion, the plaintiff in such case, although
successful, must pay the defendant its costs and an attorney fee.
A significant feature of the act is its instruction to the commissioners to seek to come to an agreement with the railroad commissioners, or other officers of the various states, as to a "draft of
statutes to be submitted to the legislatures of the different states to
secure such uniform control of railroad transportation in the different states, and from one state into or through another state, as
will best subserve the interests of trade and commerce of the whole
country." If such united action'as is here contemplated could be
arrived at it might have this advantage over any national regula-

REGULATING RAILROAD TRAFFIC.

tion of inter-state traffic, that in the former case, one system could
be adopted for.traffic in the states and between the states, whereas
national action could only affect inter-state commerce.
We have now reviewed the New England and the Western
systems of railroad regulation and its latest phase as exhibited in
certain of the Southern states. None of the Middle states have
railroad commissions, nor any special set of laws dealing with this
branch of railroad management. There are some constitutional
requirements in Pennsylvania, which the legislature has never
actd upon.1
This sketch would not be complete without including the leading
points in the railway system of Great Britain, the outcome of much
discussion and many expedients. The Railway and Canal Traffic
Act of 1854, requires that railways shall afford "reasonable
facilities for traffic, and shall give no undue or unreasonable
preference." Upon application of a party injured, the court may
issue an injunction enforceable by attachment against, officers of
the corporation and by a money penalty. As an example of how
this act has been interpreted, it was held in Nichzolmon v.
WF.
.Railway, 1 Nev. & Mac. 121, that the act did not forbid a railway
entering into an agreement securing advantages to particular individuals if it has in view only the legitimate profit of the stockhoiders, and is willing to afford the same facilities to all parties
upon similar terms; with these objects and under these modifications, discrimination is not illegal.
By the Regulation of Railways Act of 1873, a board of thrde
commissioners, removable only for cause, is created. The railways
must publish books of rates. All complaints as to rates, and
indeed, any difference to which a railway is party are referable to
the commissioners. They may fix terminal charges, decide on the
reasonableness of through rates, and, subject to the approval of the
Lord Chancellor, make general orders regulating matters under
their jurisdiction. No arrangement between companies relative to
traffic or rates can be entered into without their sanction. The

a.

I Since this article was written, there has been published a statute of Pennsylvania, passed in June 1883, forbidding undue discrimination and directing that concessions in rates and drawbacks shall be allowed to all alike upon like conditions in
similar circumstances and during tile
same period of time. Any violation of this
provision makes the offending party liable in treble damages. There is no special
mode of enforcement of the act, and except as to the quantum of damages, it is but
declaratory of the common law.

STATE LEGISLATION

commissioners' orders may be made a rule of court enforceable by
injunction. On matters of law an appeal lies from the commissioners to the courts, by a case stated. On matters of fact their
decision is final: Denaby Colliery Co. v. Railway, 3 Nev. & Mac.
439. When sitting as a court they have power to punish for contempt. The English railway commission is really a court having
cognisance of matters pertaining to traffic on railways. It does
not exercise the functions of our commissions to investigate accidents, provide for the safety of the travelling public, and supervise
the financial standing of the railways; all of which is done by the
board of trade through inspectors.
A review of railroad regulation in the United States shows that
no solution of this .perplexing problem has been attained. All is
yet in a transition state. From an inflexible system of repression
the western legislatures have come to recognise the truth that there
must and fairly may be certain inequalities in rates. Even to substitute "unjust discrimination" for "discrimination," in the wording of a statute indicates a change in the theory of railroad legislation. Still, as has been seen, even the latest western laws deviate
little from granger principles.
The recent enactments in the south, especially in Georgia and
Alabama, show a progress. In them, the hostility to corporations
so characteristic of the western laws, and which it must be admitted
is not without its excuse, is less prominent. Instead of making a
statute the only criterion of such offences as extortion and illegal
discrimination, the question is left to the decision of some tribunial, be it court or commission, upon the particular case. The
principle is further admitted that in obedience to the necessary
laws and usages of trade certain inequalities and fluctuations
in charges cannot be avoided. The importance of public opinion
is realized. And yet the principle of regulation is never let go.
Judging from the latest statutes, the drift is not at all in the direction of letting the railroads alone.
So far, the expedients which seem to promise most for the future
are boards of railroad commissioners, who shall be students as well
as supervisors of the railroad system, and a judicious extension of
the equity jurisdiction of the courts, especially in the line of man.datory injunctions. Not but that there is a good deal of virtue in
the principles of the common law of carriers, even what is left of
it, for dealing with railroad abuses; but its mode of operation, its

